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The Limits of Offshoring-Why the United States Should
Keep Enforcement of Human Rights Standards "In-House"
JOHN MCKENZIE*
INTRODUCTION
As the world becomes more integrated, the recognition that globalization constitutes
a force with growing influence over a host of transnational problems has gained
increasing traction.' In response to these problems, many theorists have posited an
emergent new world order as the construct most descriptive of how the world currently
confronts all global problems or as prescriptive on how the world should confront
these problems in the future.2 These theories often expressly or implicitly suggest that
all the global problems can be solved through a single new framework or
reconfiguration of existing frameworks.3
While the search for a unified solution can play an integral role in policy
development, this Note rejects the view that any single panacea will bring relief to the
myriad afflictions influenced by globalization. Rather, each problem requires a
solution tailored to its own unique characteristics, such that a proposed solution for
human rights abuses by private actors may prove poorly suited to confront human
rights abuses committed by state actors.
By examining the discrete global problem of corporations committing human rights
abuses, Part I of this Note will first contend that no single strategy is currently being
deployed on a global level to confront human rights abuses, corporate or otherwise.
Next, Part II will argue that global economic and legal conditions foreshadow an
increase in corporate human rights abuses because corporate actors can avoid liability
under most existing legal theories while they simultaneously increase their operations
across the globe. Finally, Part III will suggest that because globalization stands poised
to exacerbate the abuse of human rights by private actors, Congress should modify
existing legal theories and extend the jurisdiction of U.S. Courts as an effective and
desirable method of stemming the proliferation of global misfeasance by private actors.
* J.D. candidate, 2008, Indiana University School of Law-Bloomington, Bloomington,
IN; BS Economics, 1997, University of Pennsylvania-Wharton School of Business. I would like
to thank Prof. Alfred C. Aman and Laura Koenig for their helpful guidance and insight. I would
also like to thank my mother, Ljubica McKenzie, and my fiance, Anna Benefiel, for their
unfaltering support and encouragement. Of course, all errors and misstatements are my own.
1. See, e.g., Jost Delbriick, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for
Domestic Law-A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. OF GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 14-19 (1993).
2. See generally Michael Hardt & Antonio Negri, Globalization as Empire, in THE
GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 116, 117 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000);
Anthony McGrew, Models of Transnational Democracy, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS
READER, 500, 500-05 (David Held & Anthony McGrew eds., 2000).
3. See, e.g., Anne-Marie Slaughter, Governing the Global Economy Through Government
Networks, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATION READER 189, 192-93 (David Held & Anthony
McGrew eds., 2000).
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I. THE CURRENT GLOBAL RESPONSE TO HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES
An assortment of initiatives launched by governments, international institutions,
and transnational private actors has transformed human rights from a collection of lofty
aspirations into actual benchmarks augmented by global awareness and methods of
enforcement. 4 Although effective at promoting human rights as a precept of global
values, the various institutions shepherding the human rights movement thus far have
proven largely ineffective at coalescing around a single global vision of human rights.
5
Rather, different institutions often endorse different theories on how to define the
precise contours of human rights and how exactly these rights should be vindicated
once identified.6
Within this uneven theoretical landscape, legal claims tailored to confront the full
range of possible human rights abuses have yet to find solid footing. Consequently, to
understand the discrete global problem posed by private actors committing human
rights abuses, the first step in analysis requires appraising the current state of human
rights and identifying both the non-legal and legal components of their enforcement.
A. The Non-Legal Measures Taken to Address Human Rights Abuses
Although legal claims provide a familiar method for defining and enforcing
fundamental rights, the theory that law alone can serve these functions misconstrues
the growing advocacy role played by governments, international institutions, and
transnational organizations. 7 In confronting human rights abuses, international and
transnational institutions have helped define the normative foundations for human
rights and instituted monitoring programs across the globe.8 Further, governments and
international institutions have crafted political responses to egregious human rights
abuses through the use of sanctions, and even military intervention in extreme cases.
9
While these measures have certainly enhanced global awareness of human rights and
possibly decreased the incidence of abuses, non-legal measures remain confined in
their application within certain theoretical and practical limitations.
The United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("the Declaration")
ratified in 1948 provides a telling example of how international institutions can further
the theory of human rights, and yet still face limitations in garnering global
4. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch Who We Are, http://www.hrw.org/about/whowe
are.html; Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., 1st
plen. mtg. at 71, U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948); Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9 (July 17, 1998), available at http:lwww.icc-cpi.intllibrary/
about/officialjournal/RomeStatuteI 20704-EN.pdf.
5. Paul R. Dubinsky, Human Rights Law Meets Private Law Harmonization, 30 YALE J.
INTL'L L. 211, 253 (2005); Human Rights Watch Who We Are, supra note 4; G.A. Res. 217A,
supra note 4.
6. See Human Rights Watch Frequently Asked Questions, http://www.hrw.org/about/faq/.
7. Jost Delbrtick, Structural Changes in the International System and its Legal Order:
International Law in the Era of Globalization, Swiss REV. INT'L & EUR. L., 1,4 (2001).
8. See Human Rights Watch Who We Are, supra note 4.
9. Although many governmental and international responses that I have characterized as
political involve a legal element, these interventions are in their character more political than
legal insofar as adjudication and process remain the talisman of legal remedies.
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acceptance.° Despite its capacious and seminal language, the Declaration still enjoys
only partial recognition among U.N. member states if state compliance fairly
approximates recognition. 1 Many states in the U.N. openly ignore select strictures of
the Declaration, instead crafting their own roster of human rights that they feel deserve
protection. As a result, any binding effect that the Declaration may impose on states
applies to private actors only insofar as each member-state incorporates the
Declaration's tenets as cultural or legal imperatives.
Attempts by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to produce both credible
human rights standards and meaningful enforcement regimes have likewise achieved
mixed results. NGOs can operate with a flexibility largely inaccessible to staid
international institutions such as the U.N. This advantage derives from the
independence NGOs enjoy as transnational rather than international institutions.
Whereas international institutions often rely on state participation and ratification for
their legitimacy, transnational institutions instead function by developing expertise
within a certain subject and then deploying that expertise on a global level. 12
Independence from state actors certainly simplifies the process of achieving internal
consensus on human rights standards. Nevertheless, whatever advantages NGOs may
realize by foregoing cumbersome state ratification procedures comes at the cost of
widening democracy deficits and growing dissonance between NGO policy makers
and other stakeholders in the global human rights movement. However attenuated the
democratic connections between the U.N. General Assembly and the people ultimately
represented by the U.N., the ratification process of the General Assembly bears many
hallmarks of democratic decision-making.13 NGOs, in contrast, often reach their
normative conclusions without the benefit of democratic processes and with an eye
towards serving the organizational mission. One manifest result of these structural
differences is the expansive human rights definition endorsed by some NGOs, which
surpasses the scope of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.' 4
Apart from definitional problems that have undermined global consensus on the
limits of human rights, enforcement without resort to legal process poses significant
obstacles. While the U.N. and government actors have recourse to political solutions
such as sanctions, resolutions, official condemnation, and war, these choices in
practice often produce a Hobson's choice between extreme enforcement and no
enforcement at all. 15 Confronted with these stark alternatives, state governments and
the U.N. usually opt for very mild enforcement strategies, which effectively supply
10. G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 4.
11. See HuMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORT 19-35 (2005), http://www.hrw.org/
annual-report/2005.pdf.
12. See Human Rights Watch, Who We Are, supra note 4.
13. See U.N. Charter art. 27, 28, available at http://www.un.orglaboutunlcharterl
index.html. But see Robert A. Dahl, Can International Organizations be Democractic? A
Skeptic's View, in THE GLOBAL TRANSFORMATIONS READER 530, 538 (David Held & Anthony
McGrew eds., 2000).
14. See HumAN RIGHTS WATCH, ANNUAL REPORT, supra note 11, at 24-25 (describing
"corruption" as human rights abuse).
15. See Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Wins Only Mild Rebuke to North Korea, WASH. POST,
Nov. 19, 2006, available at 2006 WL 20087937.
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almost no enforcement at all. 16 Further, most of these political measures are tailored to
the problems of state actors leaving them largely inapposite as a remedy for corporate
malfeasance.
For NGOs, enforcement measures include monitoring programs, public shaming,
and global populism on the theory that by applying these tactics human rights abusers
will feel real political and economic pressure to reform. 17 In addition, the cooperation
of host states in accommodating the continued presence of NGOs proves a necessary
prerequisite to the ongoing effectiveness of these monitoring strategies supplemented
by subsequent action.' 8 The non-legal enforcement measures of NGOs, therefore, have
tended to stall in situations where 1) political and economic pressure has failed to
materialize in the wake of damaging human rights revelations, 2) political and
economic pressure has materialized, but remains insufficient to promote genuine
reform, and 3) states have suspended their cooperation with NGOs upon the revelation
of damaging information and forced them to leave the country. Thus, the non-legal
enforcement methods practiced by NGOs can yield tangible results; however, these
results depend on the particular circumstance of each case.
B. The Legal Measures Taken to Address Human Rights Abuses
The creation of substantive human rights protected by international law has
occurred predominately through a patchwork of national legal standards rather than a
unified global vision supplemented by global institutions. 19 To date, the instances
where international tribunals have adjudicated alleged human rights abuses remains the
exception, not the rule. With no international judiciary available in many cases,
national courts often provide the only legal recourse for enforcement of international
human rights norms. 20 Relying on national forums to vindicate human rights victims,
however, requires courts in each instance to determine under what circumstances they
should exercise their jurisdiction and what substantive claims stand available once
jurisdiction has been established. 2' With cultural biases entrenched in each legal
system, consensus on these issues has proven elusive with the result that only a very
small core of "crimes against humanity" survive as transnational legal theories
available to human rights victims.
22
16. See, e.g., id.
17. See Human Rights Watch Who We Are, supra note 4.
18. See Amy Kazmin, Burma Tells Red Cross to Halt Aid Projects, FIN. TIMES AsiA, Nov.
29, 2006, at 6, available, at 2006 WL 20643383.
19. See Beth Stephens, Translating Filartiga: A Comparative and International Law
Analysis of Domestic Remedies for International Human Rights Violations, 27 YALE J. INT'L
LAW 1, 35 (2002); G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 4 (articulating an international consensus on
human rights, but neglecting to propose any global institution that would vindicate such rights).
20. See Stephens, supra note 19.
21. Note, the courts must also determine which processes are available to these defendants,
but these problems come after the determination that the forum has jurisdiction as well as what
legal theory exists for this particular plaintiff. Id.
22. See Elements of the Crimes, 3d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. ICC-ASP/I/3 (Sept. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.un.orgllaw/icclasp/lstsessionlreportlenglishlpart-ii-b_e.pdf; Sosa v.
Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
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1. The Forums Available for Human Rights Claims
The jurisdictional riddles presented by human rights claims have caused many
national courts to decline jurisdiction unless the individual cases fit snugly within
comfortable parameters. National courts, however, constitute only one forum available
in the adjudication of transnational claims. International forums also exist in certain
circumstances while private, transnational arbitration procedures continue to develop
as an alternative. 23 The central question with all possible forums remains whether and
to what extent human rights claims fit within the purview of the forum's mandate.
Although national courts certainly exhibit various approaches to adjudicating
human rights abuses, several recurrent distinctions have guided the inquiry as to
whether jurisdiction applies. The first notable distinction involves determining where
the human rights abuse allegedly occurred. Because national courts rely on sovereignty
as crucial to establishing their own legitimacy, 24 human rights abuses that occur within
boundaries of the court's national territory can progress with relatively few
jurisdictional glitches. 25 Difficulties emerge, however, when courts are asked to extend
both their jurisdictional reach and legal theories to situations unconnected to the forum
state. The application of so-called universal jurisdiction to these situations constitutes
"[a radical departure] from traditional bases of prescriptive jurisdiction. 26
Invoking universal jurisdiction implicates the second distinction preeminent in
analyzing whether a national court should hear cases unconnected to the forum state-
the qualitative depravity of the offense charged. The theory for applying universal
jurisdiction originates in the ancient legal recognition that some crimes are so inimical
to human values that they have been declared crimes against all mankind.27
Consequently, any court in any nation may hear claims originating from these crimes.
However, much like the normative uncertainty concerning which rights deserve the
designation of "human rights," the scope of offenses deserving the characterization of
"crimes against all mankind" is not articulated with great legal clarity. Because
national courts commonly construct international law by reference to international
custom, 28 theoretical differences concerning the scope of human rights means that
national courts usually decline to extend universal jurisdiction unless the claim alleges
the most serious of human rights violations.
29
Provided a national court finds that a claim alleges adequately contemptible conduct
to satisfy the depravity element of universal jurisdiction, the national court may still
decline application of universal jurisdiction if the perpetrator is not a government
official. This final distinction exists because most national and international courts
have held human rights law as regulating state actors. 30 As a consequence, national
courts adhering to these theories have required a showing of governmental
23. See Elements of the Crimes, supra note 22.
24. See Delbriick, supra note 7.
25. CHANDRA LEKHA SRIRAM, GLOBALIZING JUSTICE FOR MASS ATRocrlWS 14 (2005).
26. K. Lee Boyd, Universal Jurisdiction and Structural Reasonableness, 4OTEx. INT'LL.J.
1, 8 (2004).
27. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
28. See Delbriick, supra note 7, at 26.
29. See, e.g., Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 775, 776 (2d Cir. 1984).
30. See id. But see Doe v. Unocal Corp. 395 F.3d 932, 953 (9th Cir. 2005).
2008] 1125
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involvement before a defendant, public or private, will face liability for a violation of
human rights law.
3 1
With most national courts hoisting restrictive jurisdictional barriers, international
tribunals have emerged as a theoretical model for extending jurisdictional reach to all
corners of the globe. 32 Although this approach may theoretically improve the reach of
global justice, these tribunals have historically rested their authority on very narrow
mandates, such that the reach of human rights law is not significantly enhanced by
their creation. 33 For instance, the International Criminal Court (ICC), whose creation
supposedly heralded a new era in human rights enforcement, can only reach conduct
perpetrated by nations consenting to its jurisdiction. 34 Further, the roster of offenses
that may be tried in the ICC as circumscribed by its founding treaty includes only
offenses that could fairly be understood as coextensive with those of the universal
jurisdiction.35
Apart from permanently seated international tribunals, the international community
has convened several ad-hoc tribunals in cases involving some of the most infamous
examples of human rights abuse. 36 These courts, however, usually operate under
constraints much more restrictive than those existent in permanently seated
international courts. As a preliminary matter, the very existence of these courts
requires an affirmative mandate every time international institutions determine that an
occasion warrants international judicial intervention. The mandate itself usually
confines the tribunal's reach to very narrow subject matter permitting jurisdiction over
a specific class of human rights abuses and war crimes that originate within a
specifically identified regional conflict. 37 Once the conflict ends, and the perpetrators
have faced justice, the tribunal's mandate usually expires. Given the procedural
obstacles hindering the creation of ad-hoc tribunals as well as their limited
jurisdictional reach, these tribunals rarely provide a forum for human rights abuses.
As a final alternative, international arbitration procedures have recently emerged as
a transnational private forum for adjudicating disputes between transnational actors.
However, as noted transnational legal theorist Ginther Teubner sets forth in his piece,
Global Private Regimes: Neo Spontaneous Law and Dual Constitution ofAutonomous
Sectors, these forums generally pertain to private regulatory and contract arrangements
wherein both parties agree beforehand to settle any disputes arising from the contract
with a hearing before a neutral, international arbitrator. 38 Teubner has characterized
31. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 776.
32. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. AICONF.183/9 (July
17, 1998), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/about/officialjournal/RomeStatute_
120704-EN.pdf.
33. See generally id.
34. Id. at 9.
35. See id.
36. Theodor Meron, Reflections on the Prosecution of War Crimes by International
Tribunals, 100 AM. J. INT'L L. 551, 567-68 (2006). See, e.g., Charter of the International
Military Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544.
37. Id.
38. Giinther Teubner, Global Private Regimes: Neo Spontaneous Law and Dual
Constitution ofA utonomous Sectors, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF GLOBALIZATION 74
(Giinther Teubner ed., 1997).
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this development of transnational law whereby individuals contract around an
uncertain legal environment as "spontaneous law."
39
Because arbitrators depend on the consent of adversarial parties to supply the
arbitrators with jurisdiction over a claim, human rights abuses may appear totally
incompatible with the transnational forum of arbitration. However, such a conclusion
ignores at least one promising application for arbitration: collective bargaining. Insofar
as unions can contract for higher human rights standards than those currently supplied
by the national courts of their locus nation, international arbitrators could indeed play a
vital role in civil enforcement of human rights claims.
A survey of the legal landscape for human rights forums therefore reveals a
hodgepodge of national, international, and transnational forums providing different
enforceable rights depending on the circumstances. This uneven approach produces a
stratified human rights system with large gaps in enforcement. Within nations
possessing independent courts and developed legal systems, human rights abuses will
usually invoke a multitude of conventional criminal and civil legal theories to counter
the abuse. However, in underdeveloped legal systems, the national courts may provide
no recourse for the human rights abuse victim. In these instances, the claimant may
press their charge in an international or in a foreign national forum only if their claim
constitutes a crime against all mankind and the forum possesses personal jurisdiction
over the defendant. In practical operation, this stratification permits human rights
abuses to proliferate unrestrained by the intervention of legal process so long as the
human rights abuse falls beneath the threshold of crimes against humanity, and it
occurs within a nation without legal recourse for human rights abuses.
2. The Substantive Theories Available in Different Forums
Related to the jurisdictional questions arising from the legal enforcement of human
rights is the question of which substantive legal theories apply within the various
forums open to adjudicating human rights law claims. Provided that a court has taken
jurisdiction over a claim, the first issue involves determining whether the available
legal theories furnish criminal or civil penalties as the appropriate remedy for the abuse
charged. Different forums favor different legal consequences, and while these biases
may originate in cultural differences, they portend very different legal results for
establishing accountability among different actors.
40
The majority of national and international legal forums handle claims asserting
human rights law theories as violations of national or international criminal law. 4' This
tendency finds its roots in both cultural and structural realities that make civil liability
in most forums either impossible or undesirable.42 There is an exception for cases
falling under the territorial jurisdiction of the forum state and thereby avoiding the
jurisdictional problems presented by transnational human rights claims. When this
exception applies, both criminal and civil theories may create legal liability.
Nevertheless, civil claims may prove hazardous if asserted in a regime where the loser
pays attorney's costs to the winner.
39. Id.





In cases not falling within traditional national law exceptions, the jurisdictional
problems raised by asserting human rights claims circumscribe the available legal
theories within a core of very serious human rights abuses.43 Because these claims
must allege the requisite severity to be actionable, national and international forums
traditionally have favored attaching the most serious variant of legal liability to their
commission: criminal liability. 44 International treaties that bind signatory states further
illustrate the practice of punishing human rights abuses with criminal rather than civil
liability by requiring or allowing domestic court martial or criminal trials for officials
violating the terms of the treaties.
Although applying criminal liability to human rights abuses may serve the principle
of tailoring the punishment to fit the crime, this framework leaves a large gap in
enforcement of human rights violations. Specifically, applying criminal liability to
corporate and non-state actors remains difficult under the current framework. 46 Part of
this difficulty stems from interpretations of substantive human rights law itself.
However, even if the substantive human rights law were interpreted to include non-
state actors within its ambit, much difficulty would still remain due to the practical
shortcomings in the application of criminal sanctions to corporate actors.47
Incarceration as a remedy simply proves inapplicable to corporate defendants, whereas
criminal fines, from the defendant's perspective, achieve much the same effect as
would civil remedies. On the other hand, the human rights victim would almost
certainly favor a civil remedy because criminal prosecutions usually supply greater
procedural protections for the alleged abuser, while providing no compensation to the
victim if the prosecution prevails.
Civil liability for human rights abuses remains the anomalous result in most
national and international forums. 48 However, the notable exception to this general
proposition is the federal court system of the United States. Beginning in 1984 with the
landmark case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, the United States has provided a forum for
alien human rights abuse victims if the substance of the claim meets certain restrictive
criteria. 4 9 To reach this conclusion, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit relied on an obscure statute passed in 1789 known as the Alien Torts Claim Act
(ATCA).50 The ATCA provides that "[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States.,'5 From this concise directive, several
federal courts have found the jurisdictional reach to hear cases brought by aliens
against both U.S. citizens and other aliens.
Although the Filartiga case invited speculation that the ATCA would introduce an
extra dimension to global accountability efforts, U.S. federal courts have ruled that
43. SRIRAM, supra note 25, at 14.
44. See Stephens, supra note 19, at 12.
45. See SRIRAM, supra note 25, at 65.
46. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 726, 775 (2d. Cir. 1984).
47. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisted: Lessons of the Arthur
Andersen Prosecution, 43 Am. CRim. L. REv. 107, 113 (2006).
48. See Stephens, supra note 19, at 2, 12.
49. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).




torts violating the law of nations essentially mirror those human rights violations which
constitute crimes against all mankind. 52 In the recent ruling of Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, for instance, the Supreme Court ruled that the unlawful kidnapping,
deportation, and detention of a foreign national by a civilian bounty hunter working for
the United States did not constitute a tort committed in violation of the law of nations
under the ATCA.53 Further, the broad dicta of Sosa provided federal courts some very
detailed and restrictive guideposts on how to interpret the "law of nations" element of
the ATCA. 54 Thus, it appears that ATCA doctrine simply provides human rights
defendants one less nation of refuge for the most heinous human rights abuses, but
falls short of adding substantive claims to the existing roster of actionable human
rights laws.
Given the overlap between U.S. tort law constrained by ATCA doctrine and
international human rights law constrained by universal jurisdiction theory, the current
global response to human rights abuse presents another important limitation for the
legal enforcement of human rights. This limitation involves presenting an effective
legal framework for reaching perpetrators of human rights abuses who have minimal
affiliations with any state actor. While the ATCA once held out promise as a theory
capable of reaching transnational private actors who commit human rights abuses, the
Sosa decision appears to have largely foreclosed this development for at least the time
being.
II. FILLING THE GAPS
Under the current legal regime, corporations will rarely face liability for a human
rights violation unless the locus nation of the abuse enforces such legal liability. 55 This
result derives from a confluence of factors, but one of these factors proves particularly
significant: although corporations could theoretically commit crimes against all
mankind and thereby face justice under universal jurisdiction or the ATCA, they will
in fact usually commit abuses of lesser severity and thereby escape the purview of
most existing international human rights law. While this zone of non-enforcement may
have historically encompassed a marginal percentage of total human rights abuses,
globalization has rapidly altered the landscape. Outsourcing by established
corporations, government outsourcing of central governmental functions, and corporate
expansion into lawless corners of the globe have made the conditions ripe for abuses
falling beneath the universal jurisdiction standard to proliferate.
. A. Defining the Zone of Non-Enforcement
To understand the scale of the potential abuses that may become manifest as global
interaction increases, one must first identify which human rights fall below the
threshold required for the exercise of universal jurisdiction and the ATCA. Currently,
human rights abuses meeting the standards of universal jurisdiction can find a forum
for vindication. These include genocide, torture, war crimes violating the Geneva
52. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. See generally supra Part I.
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Conventions, slavery, and piracy. 6 Beyond this core, some forums recognize other
human rights abuses, such as extra-judicial killing, extra-judicial arrest, prolonged
arbitrary detention, acts of apartheid, and several others. 57 Notwithstanding this
growing roster of violations that invoke universal jurisdiction, several human rights
enumerated in the United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights ("the
Declaration") still receive only limited enforcement.58 Determining which rights fall
within this category of limited enforcement as well as the applicability of these rights
to corporate actors constitutes the first step in appraising the shortcomings of the
current regime.
1. The Human Rights Violations Likely to Occur
Among the rights in the Declaration outside the category protected by universal
jurisdiction are many that might stand particularly vulnerable to abuse by corporate
actors. These include Article Three, granting the right of security of person; Article
Seventeen, granting the right for persons to own property; Article Twenty-Three,
granting the right for persons to choose their place of employment; and Article
Twenty-Nine, which limits the rights of each person to prevent one person from
exercising their rights in interference with the rights of others. 59 While many of the
most developed nations in the world fall short of vindicating each article of the
Declaration, questions remain about which rights should have global reach and
whether corporate actions fall under the rubric of human rights violations.
60
The U.N. and several non-governmental organizations have attempted to
supplement the original Declaration with subsequent measures aimed at clarifying the
role of private actors within the human rights regime.6' One of these documents, the
United Nations Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (Norms), specifically addresses the
role of corporations. Perhaps the most consistent point of emphasis contained within
the Norms is the repeated call for transnational corporations and other entities to
respect the security interests of their employees, customers, and fellow citizens by
providing safe products, safe workplaces, and minimal environmental degradation. 62
Thus it would appear that a growing international consensus exists suggesting that
security interests constitute a human rights value warranting increased protection.
56. See SRURAM, supra note 25, at 14; BETH STEPHENS & MICHAEL RATNER, INTERNATIONAL
HUiAN RIGrHTS LMGATION IN U.S. CouRTs 79-107 (1996).
57. See Amnesty International, Universal Jurisdiction: 14 Principles on the Effective
Exercise of Universal Jurisdiction, http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/engior530011999
?OpenDocument.
58. G.A. Res. 217A, supra note 4.
59. See id.
60. The United States, for instance, does not offer universal healthcare.
61. U.N Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm. on the
Promotion and Protection of Human Rights, United Nations Human Rights Norms for
Corporations (Aug. 26, 2003), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/O/
64155e7e8141 b38cc I 256d63002c55e8?Opendocument.
62. Id. at 3, 4, 7, 13.
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2. The Role Played by Corporations
The structure and language of the Declaration as well as the origins and
circumstances surrounding the development of human rights suggest that human rights
law began as a theory to counter atrocities committed by states. 63 As a consequence,
many legal systems have opted against applying the strictures of human rights law to
most actions of non-state actors. 64 Although this theory prevails for legal remedies, the
position that corporations cannot commit human rights abuses as a factual matter
constitutes a highly formalistic and increasingly disfavored perspective. 65
A quick survey of the criminal offenses within the jurisdiction of the International
Criminal Court (ICC) reveals that the differentiating feature distinguishing many
human rights abuses from conventional offenses is the order of magnitude implicit in
the human rights offense 66 For instance, in order for murder to become a crime against
humanity under ICC doctrine, the murder must take place "as part of a widespread or
systematic attack directed against a civilian population., 67 This element requiring a
widespread or systematic attack simply forecloses most private actors from even
wielding the ability to commit the offense. As corporations grow in scale, power, and
influence, however, they constitute a growing exception to the general proposition that
private actors remain too impotent to engage in conduct abusive to human rights.
Apart from identifying the increasing importance of security interests within the
human rights framework, the U.N. Norms acknowledge the growing influence of
corporate actors as potential abusers of human rights. With this acknowledgement, the
conclusion follows that state and corporate actors no longer stand on distinctively
different planes in the field of human rights standards. Rather, the analogy between
states and transnational corporations appears too obvious for the U.N. to ignore.
68
Therefore, while corporations may prove incapable of violating human rights as a
matter of international law in most cases, as a matter of fact, they remain quite capable
of committing such violations and causing injury to the security interests of their
employees, customers, and fellow citizens.
63. See SRIRAM, supra note 25, at 65.
64. See Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Rep., 726 F.2d 774, 776 (D.C. Cir. 1984). But see Doe I
v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 953 (9th Cir. 2002).
65. See generally United Nations Human Rights Norms for Corporations, supra note 61.
66. See Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,
Elements of the Crimes, 1st Sess., 3d plen. mtg., U.N. Doec. ICC-ASP/I/3 (Sept. 9, 2002),
available at http://www.un.org/law/icc/asp/lstsession/reportlenglishpartibii-be.pdf.
67. Id. at art. 7(l)(a)(2).
68. In fact, many theorize that the real danger in the future is a general weakening of state
laws and protections in favor of making conditions more accommodating to corporations. See
Karl-Heinz Ladeur, Globalization and the Conversion of Democracy to Polycentric Networks:
Can Democracy Survive the End of the Nation State?, in PUBLIC GOVERNANCE IN THE AGE OF
GLOBALIZATION 89,90 (Karl-Heinz Ladeur ed., 2004).
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B. The Impact of Globalization on Human Rights Abuses
Within an environment of heightened awareness for corporate violations, the global
scope of corporate conduct has dramatically increased over the last century. 69 This
increase has come through both foreign direct investment of multi-national
corporations and outsourcing of services and production to corporations headquartered
abroad.70 The effect of these initiatives is that today outsourcing has been estimated to
account for twenty-five percent of international trade, and developing nations have
increased their share of global manufactured exports from 6.6% to 24.7% between the
1960s and 1990s.71 These statistics suggest that globalization has dramatically
increased the economic contacts between developed and developing nations, with
developing nations becoming central figures in the global supply chain.
Although transnational global organizations have shown great competence in
effectuating the objectives of integrating the global economy, 72 analogous
organizations committed to developing high human rights standards have yet to
achieve the same successes. As a result, the legal enforcement of human rights norms
that remain ineligible for enforcement under the universal jurisdiction theory has
largely fallen to national courts who can assert traditional bases of jurisdiction. 73 In
developed nations, there are usually a variety of forums and legal theories capable of
reaching conduct within the human rights norms articulated by the U.N. These theories
include basic negligence theories, intentional torts, and criminal sanctions in extreme
cases. However, this same level of enforcement remains largely aspirational for much
of the developing world.
When globalization increases the velocity of interactions between corporations and
persons across the globe, and large swaths of the globe remain unprotected by
developed legal systems, it should come as no surprise that alleged corporate human
rights abuses tend to concentrate in those areas of weak legal enforcement.74 In a
recent report examining sixty-five alleged corporate human rights abuses spread across
twenty-seven countries, twenty-five of the twenty-seven countries scored below
average on the "rule of law" index developed by the World Bank. 75 Further, the report
goes on to conclude that "there is clearly a negative symbiosis between the worst
corporate-related human rights abuses and host countries that are characterized by a
combination of relatively low national income, current or recent conflict exposure, and
69. Nicholas Crafts, Globalization and Growth in the Twentieth Century 28, Int'l Monetary
Fund, Working Paper No. WP/00/44 (2000), available at http://www.imf.org/extemal/pubs/ft/
wp/2000/wpOO44.pdf.
70. Id. at 27.
71. See id.
72. See Delbrick, supra note 1, at 14-19.
73. See SRiRm, supra note 25, at 14.
74. Commission on Human Rights, Interim Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, 62d Sess., 27, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/2006/97 (Feb. 22,2006) (prepared by





weak or corrupt governance., 76 If this observation proves accurate, and the global
economy continues to expand as it has over the last forty years, 77 the future promises
an increase in the incidence of human rights abuses within those nations least prepared
to confront them.
While global economic activity continues to expand into some of the more lawless
corners of the globe, government outsourcing of core government functions reveals
another method through which human rights abuses may flourish. In the United States,
the recent movement towards privatization has seen governments privatize everything
78from management of prisons within the United States, to training of troops within a
war zone. 79 Inserting private contractors into hostile and dangerous environments,
however, invites the possibility that the contractors may suffer or inflict human rights
abuses.8°
To witness the potential for human rights abuse that may occur by co-mingling
private contractors and highly volatile situations, one need only look to the Abu Ghraib
prison scandal in Iraq. During the Abu Ghraib scandal, private contractors engaged in
intelligence gathering and took part in the abuse of Iraqi prisoners under the custodial
care of the United States. 81 The abuses at Abu Ghraib included holding detainees on
leashes, forcing detainees to crawl for four to six hours, attaching electronic cables to
detainees and telling detainees they would be electrocuted if they fell off of a box,
forcing detainees to masturbate, and other conduct committed by soldiers and
contractors intended to inflict physical, psychological, or sexual harm on detainees. 
82
The Abu Ghraib scandal, however, only illustrates one dimension of abuse that may
occur when contractors deploy in dangerous situations. While this scandal attracted
much attention in the press, 83 the possibility that private contractors may become
victims of human rights abuses also finds support in the experience of the Iraq War-
over 650 private contractors have already died in that conflict. 84 Furthermore, while
many nations have failed to embrace privatization with the same enthusiasm as the
United States, the prospect of multinational corporations assuming the prison
management and military campaigns of foreign governments presents human rights
ramifications of potentially staggering proportions.
76. Id. at 30. In addition to these general observations, anecdotal evidence and case law
also corroborate the observation that most corporate human rights abuses occur in the
developing world. See, e.g., Doe I v. Unocal Corp., 395 F.3d 932, 937-39 (9th Cir.
2002); Evan Clark, Advocacy Group Finds Violations at Bangladesh Apparel Factory,
WOMEN'S WEAR DALY, Oct. 26, 2006, at 14.
77. See supra text accompanying note 69.
78. See ALFRED C. AMAN JR., THE DEMOCRACY DEFIcrr: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH
LAW REFORM 102 (2004).
79. See Laura A. Dickinson, Public Law Values in a Privatized World, 31 YALE J. INTL'L L.
383, 391 (2006).
80. Id.; Michael A. Cohen & Maria Figueroa, Reining in Military Contractors, WASH.
POST, Dec. 7, 2006.
81. See Dickinson, supra note 79, at 391.
82. Douglas Jehl & Eric Schmitt, The Struggle for Iraq: Abu Ghraib; Officer Says Army
Tried to Curb Red Cross Visits to Prison in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 2004, at Al.
83. See, e.g., id.
84. See Cohen & Figueroa, supra note 80.
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Il. THE ROLE OF UNITED STATES CIVIL LAW IN FILLING THE GAP
With globalization trends falling ever further into legal limbo, corporate human
rights abuses appear poised to increase in the coming years. Avoiding this outcome
will require an adjustment to the current international legal regime to create a new
paradigm that strengthens the legal systems within each territory, or increases the
scope of transnational theories available in national and international forums. Several
factors suggest that opening the United States court system would constitute a
particularly effective and desirable forum for confronting human rights abuses
committed by corporations.
The factors that support expanding transnational claims in the United States include
the current state of the law in the United States, the bona fide United States's interest
in confronting human rights abuses, and the likelihood that alternative measures would
prove less effective at deterring corporate human rights abuse. Despite the many
virtues that United States civil remedies may one day bring, the expansion of United
States jurisdiction has prompted a variety of objections from both inside and outside
the United States. These objections rest on the theory that, if the United States courts
adopt a cavalier approach when applying transnational legal theories, this approach
will undermine, rather then support, global stability.
85
Given the international and domestic misgivings about universal jurisdiction, the
mechanics for expanding any transnational claims should come through legislative,
rather than judicial, methods. 86 With the need to confront human rights abuses,
however, this appeal to legislative process should not become the basis for indefinite
delay. Therefore, Congress should act with purpose to draft new transnational claims
that may be brought in the United States under the jurisdiction of the Alien Torts Claim
Act (ATCA) and that are tailored to the unique problem of corporate human rights
abuses occurring in developing nations.
A. Virtues of the United States Legal System
The current state of law within the United States provides an excellent cultural and
legal foundation for the expansion of human rights claims as applied to corporations.
87
This cultural and legal framework includes the establishment of personal jurisdiction
on the basis of contacts, 88 the legal influence of the ATCA, 89 and the friendliness of
the United States courts to lawsuits by impecunious plaintiffs. 9° When combined with
the preference for civil relief as a remedy for addressing corporate malfeasance, the
United States system offers a roster of advantages that is unparalleled in the
international system.
85. See Luisa Antoniolli, Taking Legal Pluralism Seriously: The Alien Tort Claims Act and
the Role of International Law Before U.S. Federal Courts, 12 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 651,
659-660(2005).
86. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 727 (2004).
87. Stephens, supra note 19, at 6-12.
88. See Int'l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 320 (1945).
89. See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.
90. Stephens, supra note 19, at 14-17.
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1. Jurisdiction in United States Court System
For United States federal courts to exert jurisdiction over a claim, the United States
Constitution requires each court to possess jurisdiction over both the defendant and the
subject matter of the controversy. 9' As the Supreme Court has re-calibrated the
constitutional due process requirements, personal jurisdiction doctrine has evolved
from a system once requiring actual service of process to the defendant's person into a
system where service and minimum contacts will suffice. 92 As a result, a defendant
need not actually reside in the territory where a complaint is filed, but rather may still
be hailed into court provided he or she purposefully avails themselves to the forum
state. 93 In this analysis, the federal courts of the United States deviate from the
traditional bases of international jurisdiction: territorial (where the offense was
committed or had its effects), passive personal (based on the nationality of the victim),
protective (when a national interest is at stake), and national (based on the nationality
of the offender).94 Although not a traditional basis of jurisdiction, minimum contacts
analysis, when combined with federal question jurisdiction, provides a valuable
filtering mechanism to insure that only claims connected to the forum are heard.
The theory of minimum contacts, as applied to human rights abuses, both expands
the reach of U.S. courts and also insures that the United States has a bona fide interest
in the resolution of a particular controversy. In this sense, minimum contacts
jurisdiction parallels the effects theory.95 Using the effects theory, a forum nation may
exercise jurisdiction when the effects of lawless activity outside its territory affect
conditions within the forum nation.96 The effects theory provides an imperfect
analogue to minimum contacts doctrine because minimum contacts retains no absolute
requirement that the individual case arise out of negative effects.97 Still, the fact that a
corporation avails itself of the United States provides both a legal foundation for the
courts to assert personal jurisdiction as well as a normative foundation to assert United
States interest and values. In the case of human rights abuses, the United States'
interest in preventing the influx of goods and services produced in connection with
human rights abuses is a bona fide, legitimate interest worthy of deference.
Apart from the doctrine and policy that render minimum contacts a sound proxy for
United States personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain
recently interpreted the ATCA as a constitutionally legitimate grant of subject matter
jurisdiction to the district courts.98 While the Court affirmed the rationale of Filartiga
in the Sosa case, it also cautioned the district courts against interpreting the ATCA too
broadly. 99 Rather, the Court explicitly limited the range of torts that violate the law of
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2; Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
92. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320.
93. McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957).
94. SRIRAM, supra note 25, at 14.
95. Boyd, supra note 26, at 7-8.
96. Id.
97. See Int'l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 320. Also, the effects theory is often used as a justification
for the establishment of laws that expand beyond a forum nation to impose criminal and
regulatory sanctions. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1201 (Supp. 2006); 18 U.S.C. § 1203 (2000).
98. 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
99. Id. at 725.
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nations to a very narrow range of offenses and held that the ATCA is purely
jurisdictional. 10o However, the dicta of Sosa suggests that the district courts may take
cases under ATCA jurisdiction if Congress passes a law that invokes such jurisdiction
and provides for a specific cause of action. 101 Thus, Congress effectively enjoys more
power than the courts in crafting claims to fit within the ATCA.
2. Other Advantages of United States Courts
The jurisdictional doctrines of minimum contacts and the ATCA provide a
favorable foundation for asserting a claim in a United States court. However, the
jurisdictional doctrine only insures that a plaintiff can bring a claim. Jurisdiction alone
fails to address whether a plaintiff would in fact bring a claim, assuming that he or she
can bring it. In the corporate human rights context, willingness to bring a claim
provides an important consideration because private actions against corporations
function as a deterrent to abusive conduct. Further, many abuses brought under ATCA
jurisdiction would likely take place far away from the United States, meaning that
logistical hurdles would already create obstacles. 102 Such hurdles and the personal
jurisdiction problems that they entail might ultimately dissuade an otherwise
meritorious plaintiff from entering litigation. 103 Therefore, vindicating people who
have suffered human rights abuses at the hands of corporations requires a civil system
amenable to finding judgments for plaintiffs and reducing any potential litigation costs
to a bare minimum.
The United States civil court system addresses these concerns with a legal culture
and procedural framework that remains the most plaintiff-friendly in the world
today. 104 Unlike most nations, the United States does not operate on a "loser pays"
system that can severely deter meritorious litigation simply because the potential fees
act as a compelling deterrent. 105 Instead, in the United States the payment of fees to an
adverse party upon losing a case remains the exception, not the rule. 106 Further, other
legal advantages exist in the United States, such as the contingency fee payment
structure and the availability of punitive damages. 107 There is no requirement that civil
and criminal trials concerning the same facts proceed at the same time, nor does the
United States share the prevailing international sentiment against using litigation as
means of policy reform. 108 As a result, the United States provides a forum of lower
cost and higher possible payoff that could operate as an incentive to bring claims that
might otherwise prove too onerous to litigate.
The arguments that show the United States as a superior venue for compensating
victims likewise cut in favor of the United States as an enforcer capable of deterring
bad conduct committed by corporations. This conclusion stems from the strong policy
100. Id. at 714-15.
101. Id. at 726-28.
102. See SRIRAM, supra note 25, at 9.
103. See Stephens, supra note 19, at 12.
104. Id. at 16.
105. Id. at 14-15.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 15.
108. Id. at 12-14.
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arguments in favor of civil, rather than criminal, penalties for corporate actors.'19 As a
practical matter, the notion of criminal liability for corporate actors proves inapplicable
in many contexts, because ascribing mental culpability to corporations is difficult and
the criminal sanction of imprisonment remains unavailable.
B. The Policy Considerations to Bear in Mind
While the United States may offer a favorable venue for plaintiffs to litigate future
human rights claims, many observers have expressed deep reservations about the
extension of universal jurisdiction to cases so disconnected from the forum. 110 Some
international observers fear that expanded jurisdiction will become a license for United
States courts to exert hegemonic influence."' Domestic critics worry that expanded
jurisdiction will upset the delicate balance of power between the branches of
government. 112 Notwithstanding the force of these concerns, they tend to become less
worrisome upon examination of the doctrines courts may use to decline jurisdiction
and upon the realization that the legislature can effectively curtail most judicial
indiscretion through properly crafting causes of action brought under ATCA
jurisdiction.
To prevent the specter of every global negligence case finding its way into United
States courts under a human rights theory, Congress and the courts have several
options at their disposal. First, the courts have several doctrines available to decline
jurisdiction, including: forum non-conveniens doctrine, political question doctrine,
sovereign immunity doctrine, and international comity doctrine. 113 In the years
preceding Sosa, these doctrines were applied with regularity to dispose of ATCA
cases, such that only a handful of claims actually survived on appeal. 14 This history
indicates that United States courts have and will exercise due caution when deciding
cases that may upset international relations.
Additionally, Congress can quite effectively limit the scope of any civil claim. To
prevent open-ended extensions of the law, Congress could draft civil claim statutes that
parallel human rights criminal laws, such as those applied in the International Criminal
Court (ICC). Further, Congress could graft an element of scale to statutes recognizing
new civil claims .115 Thus, in order for negligence to be a human rights abuse,
Congress could add the requirement that human rights negligence must actually reach
the level of gross negligence and emanate from a systematic practice that amounts to
standard business operations. Through adding the elements of gross negligence and
standard business operations, courts would arguably apply the law only to situations
posing a genuine threat to human rights. This practice of tracking ICC drafting would
also insert comparative law principles directly into the statutes and thereby allay some
of the concerns posed by critics of hegemonic United States values. Also, by drafting
109. See generally Ainslie, supra note 47; supra Part I.B.2.
110. See Antoniolli, supra note 85; Boyd, supra note 26.
111. See Antoniolli, supra note 85, at 664-65.
112. See Boyd, supra note 26, at 12-16.
113. Id. at2.
114. Id. at 46-58. It is interesting to note that transnational corporations have greatly
exaggerated the litigation threat posed by the ATCA. See StRHAM, supra note 25, at 76.
115. See supra Part II.A.
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individual causes of action, Congress could proceed bit-by-bit into different areas of
potential abuse without fear that legal principles applying in one context would be
transported by judges to another context. This method could allow for cautious
expansion that would further allay hegemonic fears.
C. The Effectiveness of Congressional Statutes Directed
Against Corporate Human Rights Abuse
Perhaps the most important feature supporting a congressional response creating
actions against private actors for human rights abuses is the comparative effectiveness
that such measures would hold over any alternatives. These alternatives include: non-
legal responses of NGOs, a legal response applying criminal law to corporations in
national or international forums, and a legal response applying civil law to
corporations in national or international forums outside the United States. For each of
these alternatives, the current state of law, the relative power of transnational
corporations, or the current state of transnational organizations render the emergence
of any countermeasures designed to thwart human rights abuses either unlikely or even
counter-productive.
Recent history has demonstrated that actions by NGOs against alleged corporate
abuses can produce unintended results, 116 whereas legal accountability in other forums
tends to stall because many nations' domestic law does not reach corporate
behavior, " 7 or the national government where the abuse took place is unwilling or
unable to confront the abusers. " 8 For NGOs, the problem with confronting human
rights abusers involves the limitations of public shaming as an agent of change. Public
shaming can produce meaningful results, but it appears incapable of halting the
abusive practices of stubborn laggards. 19 Further, at least in the sweatshop context,
public shaming can actually produce more injury than the alleged abuse if a
corporation leaves a region to avoid negative publicity. 120 Regarding holding
corporations accountable for human rights violations, claimants tend consistently to
butt against either legal limitations, in the form of limited law or unwilling forums,' 2'
or power limitations insofar as a national court lacks the necessary enforcement power
to halt abuses within its national boundaries. 1
22
Congressional creation of new human rights claims, however, suffers few of the
shortfalls that hinder other attempts at stemming corporate human rights abuses. First,
as the law would apply worldwide, the risk imposed by stubborn laggards and possible
corporate defections would be greatly reduced. Whereas defections might save a
116. Nicholas D. Kristof, Op-Ed., In Praise of the Maligned Sweatshop, N.Y. TIMES, June 6,
2006, at A21.
117. See supra Part ll.B.
118. See Ladeur, supra note 68, at 90; Interim Report of the Special Representative of the
Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporations and Other
Business Enterprises, supra note 74.
119. See Robin Broad, A Better Mousetrap?, in CAN WE PuT AN END TO SWEATSHOPS 43,47
(Joshua Cohen & Joel Rogers eds., 2001).
120. See Kristof, supra note 116.
121. See supra Part I.B.
122. Ladeur, supra note 68, at 90.
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corporation from bad publicity, they would not save a corporation from legal liability
under a human rights statute. Further, the United States' legal and cultural framework
comes equipped with doctrine that takes an expansive view of personal jurisdiction and
encourages plaintiffs to seek redress. 2 3 Also, while the courts in the United States
today exhibit much of the same reluctance as other national and international forums in
adjudicating human rights claims, this reluctance would likely weaken if the courts
could act under an affirmative congressional mandate. 124 Finally, the desirability of
access to the United States markets gives U.S. courts ample power to enforce
judgments and maintain their independence in adjudicating claims.
CONCLUSION
In the absence of congressional action on the issue of corporate human rights
abuses, the United States could become the world's largest underwriter of private
torturers and the world's largest consumer market for abusive producers. This
regrettable conclusion would occur, despite its obvious repugnance to American and
global values, because international and domestic law as currently interpreted offer
little in the way of deterrence for non-state actors who are abusive of human rights. 1
2 5
With its decision in Sosa, the Supreme Court effectively cabined ATCA doctrine such
that courts now have little maneuverability to hold private actors civilly liable under
the ATCA without other enabling legislation. 126 Therefore, if a legal theory should
exist to hold private actors accountable for human rights abuses, this theory must
originate in another branch of government.
The Supreme Court grappled with legitimate concerns when it declined in Sosa to
vest the judiciary with a blank canvas under the ATCA. These concerns have haunted
the vast majority of ATCA cases, and they involve worries about affecting
international relations with frivolous claims against foreign government officials or
putting the courts in the awkward position of trying to interpret foreign laws. 1
27
Congress, however, can easily resolve such concerns with the statutes drafted to
exclude government officials and clarify the offenses worthy of relief under the
ATCA. The Court, constrained by the Constitution and its own precedent, cannot
easily achieve these results.
The Court has recognized that Congress has the competence and authority to draft
legislation that would deter private human rights abuses, but thus far Congress has
shown little initiative to assert American values by giving abuse victims a forum in
United States courts. This result has occurred even though any human rights litigation
against foreign defendants must first meet the constitutional due process requirement
of minimum contacts. 128 As Congress lies stagnant, however, a potential crisis looms
with globalization encouraging interactions between corporate actors, volatile
situations, unstable legal systems, and desperate individuals. As these interactions
increase, human rights abuses will follow. Moreover, several of the perpetrators of
123. See supra Part II.A.
124. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728 (2004).
125. See supra Part I.B.1.
126. See supra Part ffl.A.1.
127. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 707-08, 727-28.
128. See supra Part III.
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these abuses will have minimum contacts with the United States. Such a scenario
produces the absurd result whereby America's economic markets would stand open for
business to corporate abusers, but her court house doors would stand closed to the
abuse victims' pleas.
Rather than perpetuate a system that provides an economic windfall to those
abusing human rights in the developing world, Congress should assert its authority as
the repository of American values and equip human rights victims with the world's
most effective deterrent against corporate malfeasance: the United States civil court
system. Statutes composed to supplement the subject matterjurisdiction granted under
the ATCA enjoy the implicit legal endorsement of the Supreme Court, 129 as well as the
moral endorsement of the world's human rights victims. All that is lacking is the
endorsement of Congress.
129. See supra Part Ill.
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